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Witness Explanations During Cross-Examination:
A Rule of Evidence Examined
Professor McCormick prefaced the 1954 edition of his Handbook of the
Law of Evidence with this observation: "That part of the law of procedure
known as evidence law has not responded in recent decades to the need
for . . . rationalization as rapidly as other parts of procedural law."'
Twenty-eight years later his observation still rings true. This note
considers one common law rule of evidence which has never been rationally
examined: the rule which allows a witness to explain any answer during
cross-examination.2 In an effort to rationally examine the rule,' considera-
tion is given to the goals of the adversary system as they are affected
by the current rule and by the rule proposed by this note. An attempt
is made to rationalize the rule, as McCormick urged, so that it best
promotes achievement of the adversary system's goals. This note concludes
that the current rule is inconsistent with the goals of the adversary system
and advocates a rule in which the cross-examiner is able to hold a witness
to a direct answer, without explanation, during cross-examination except
in specified situations.'
C. McCORMICK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE xi (Ist ed. 1954).
2 Explanation of answers is usually only a problem on cross-examination. On direct
examination, counsel wants his witness to fully explain answers and to narrate his testimony.
T. MAUET, FUNDAMENTALS OF TRIAL TECHNIQUES 94-95 (1980); C. MCCORMICK, sup'ra note 1,
at 8. It is only on cross-examination, where the examiner has had no opportunity to talk
to or coach the witness, that explanations may lead to inadmissible testimony. See infra
text accompanying notes 24-28.
' The rule of evidence examined here is not so much a "rule" as a "preferred ruling."
In other words, it is not automatically applied whenever a cross-examination witness seeks
to explain an answer. "The trial judge is entitled to considerable latitude in determining
whether a witness should be allowed to explain his answer." Bank v. Egan, 240 Minn. 192,
201, 60 N.W.2d 257, 262 (1958). Accord State v. Goodyear, 98 Ariz. 304, 327, 404 P.2d 397,
413 (1965), rev'd on other grounds, 100 Ariz. 244, 413 P.2d 566 (1966); FED. R. EVID. 611(a).
However, in the absence of circumstances directing otherwise, the current preferred ruling
is to allow a witness to explain himself. State v. Rouse, 256 La. 275, 280, 236 So. 2d 211,
212 (1970). In the same manner, the rule proposed by this note should not be blindly applied,
but should be based on the trial judge's perception of the demeanor of both the witness
and cross-examiner. See infra note 4. The rule proposed by this note differs from the current
rule in that the preferred ruling in the same circumstances would be to disallow explana-
tion during cross-examination. See infra text accompanying notes 30-31.
' The illustrations supporting the proposed rule throughout this note are cases in which
the cross-examiner was honestly trying to elicit undisclosed testimony and the witness
was trying to keep the full truth from being heard, usually by relevant but unresponsive
"explanations." In these situations, it is obvious that witness explanation is undesirable.
See infra text accompanying notes 55-85. However, sometimes the situation is reversed-
the witness is honest but the cross-examiner tries to misconstrue his testimony. See Banks
v. State, 113 Ga. App. 661, 662, 149 S.E.2d 415, 416 (1966), where the cross-examiner used
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
THE CURRENT RULE
Many state courts have responded to the question whether a witness
may explain an answer during cross-examination.' The courts hold that
ordinarily a witness is permitted to explain his answer." In cases discuss-
ing witness explanations, the general rule varies only slightly. Where the
question calls for a yes or no answer, some states require the witness
to answer yes or no first, then allow the explanation.7 Others hold that
as long as the explanation by its natural implications contains the answer
requested, no objection will be heard.' The trial judge always has
discretion to limit explanations;9 however, most courts freely allow
explanation of answers during cross-examination."0
an inaccurate hypothetical question to misconstrue the witnesses' testimony. Where this
is true, although opposing counsel will usually elicit the necessary explanation on redirect,
the arguments supporting the proposed rule do not apply. Therefore, the trial judge should
retain his discretion to control testimony under the proposed rule and may allow the witness
to explain during cross-examination. Since the trial judge personally witnesses the demeanor
of the witness and the cross-examiner, he should have discretion, reviewable only for abuse,
to allow an explanation during cross-examination where the cross-examiner is the one trying
to interfere with the search for truth. This note does not suggest that the trial judge's
discretion should be limited and that the appellate court should reverse when explanation
during cross-examination is allowed. See generally supra note 3 (trial judges currently have
discretion over explanations).
I See, e.g., Swygert v. Willard, 166 Ind. 25, 76 N.E. 755 (1906); State v. Rouse, 256 La.
275, 236 So. 2d 211 (1970); Bank v. Egan, 240 Minn. 192, 60 N.W.2d 257 (1953); State v.
Marshall, 571 S.W.2d 768 (Mo. Ct. App. 1978); Commonwealth v. Dalton, 199 Pa. Super.
388, 185 A.2d 653 (1962; Adams v. State, 156 Tex. Crim. 63, 225 S.W.2d 568 (1949), modified,
229 S.W.2d 64 (1950) (sentence clarified).
6 See, e.g., cases cited supra note 5.
See, e.g., Banks v. State, 113 Ga. App. 661, 661-62, 149 S.E.2d 415, 416 (1966).
8 Adams v. State, 156 Tex. Crim. 63, 225 S.W.2d 568 (1949), modified, 229 S.W.2d 64
(1950) (sentence clarified); see State v. Rouse, 256 La. 275, 236 So. 2d 211 (1970).
' Bank v. Egan, 240 Minn. 192, 201, 60 N.W.2d 257, 262 (1958); accord State v. Goodyear,
98 Ariz. 304, 327, 404 P.2d 397, 413 (1965), rev'd on other grounds, 100 Ariz. 244, 413 P.2d
566 (1966); FED. R. EVID. 611(a).
10 Admittedly, it is difficult to determine how most trial judges exercise their discretion
since so few trial transcripts are printed; however, three sources suggest that most courts
do freely allow explanations during cross-examination. First, articles by trial lawyers indicate
that explanations are generally allowed. See, e.g., Preiser, Cross-examination of Lay Witnesses,
TRIAL, Dec. 1977, at 22, 24 ("First of all you cannot contain the witness. How many times can
you really hold the witness to a yes or no answer-the judge will say, yes, you may explain
your answer. You are going to get the explanation."). Second, law review articles by trial
judges indicate that explanations are allowed. See, e.g., Shientag, Cross-Examination-A
Judge's Viewpoint, 3 REC. 12 (1948). Third, excerpts of trial records found in appellate opin-
ions indicate that most trial courts allow explanation. See, e.g., trial court record reprinted
in People v. Jackson, 44 Cal. 2d 511, 518-19, 282 P.2d 898, 902 (1955) (statement by trial
judge: "You know, Mr. Winters, it is the usual courtroom procedure to permit a witness
to explain his answer, and you are not going to stand there and prevent this witness from
explaining his answers."); Central Ind. Ry. v. Mikesell, 189 Ind. App. 478, 221 N.E.2d 192
(1966).
In recent years, a few cases suggest that the current rule is being changed to the rule
advocated in this note and that witnesses are being allowed to explain their cross-examination
answers only on redirect examination. Carreras v. Honeggers & Co., Inc., 68 Mich. App.
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The current rule had appeared in decisions in several states by 1910.11
Explanation of the decision in most of these early cases follows a similar
pattern. The opinion reprints the cross-examination dialogue to which
exception was taken, followed by the explanation that was given or
attempted. The court then states that a witness may explain his answers,
and the exception is overruled.12 Usually no analysis supports the decision.
From those few cases which have discussed the reasons for allowing
explanation, it appears that the rule is predicated on notions of "natural
justice [and] common sense."'3 Natural justice appears to be the idea that
the best way to uncover the truth at trial is to put the witness on the
stand and let him tell everything he knows about the controversy and
that attempts by the cross-examiner to limit a witness' answers are
therefore attempts to hide the truth. 4 Recent cases have done little to
expand upon this shallow analysis. 5
Before discussing the propriety of allowing explanations during cross-
examination, it must be understood that when judges allow an answer
by terming it an "explanation" they may mean more than the general
usage of the word. "Explanation," as the courts use the word, has two
very different meanings. The first meaning of "explanation" merely refers
to clarifying the witness' answer and is the same as the general usage
of the word by the public. The second meaning of "explanation" might
more correctly be termed an unresponsive answer which contains rele-
vant facts.18 As the illustration below indicates, this is the type of ex-
planation to which objections are raised, because the answers are poten-
tially disruptive, evasive, and prejudicial. 7
The latter type of explanation shows how the current rule allowing
explanations can and sometimes does contradict the rule that requires
a witness to make responsive answers to questions by the examiner.
Evidence law has traditionally recognized, at least in theory, the general
right of an examiner to have a witness' unresponsive answers stricken
716, 244 N.W.2d 10 (1976); Guzman v. State, 471 S.W.2d 845, 846-47 (Tex. Crim. App. 1971)
(quoting 1 C. MCCORMICK & R. RAY, TEXAS LAW OF EVIDENCE S 621 (2d ed. 1956)). Although
these recent cases reach the right result, they do not discuss the reasons behind that result.
This note attempts to outline the reasons why witnesses should only be allowed to explain
cross-examination answers on redirect and thereby show why these recent cases are correct.
H See, e.g., Smalls v. State, 102 Ga. 31, 29 S.E. 153 (1897); Brace v. State, 43 Tex. Crim.
48, 62 S.W. 1067 (1901).
" See, e.g., Smalls v. State, 102 Ga. 31, 29 S.E. 153 (1897).
13 In re Will of Tatum, 233 N.C. 723, 726, 65 S.E.2d 351, 353 (1951); accord Dennehy v.
O'Connell, 66 Conn. 175, 181, 33 A. 920,_ 922 (1895).
" Wigmore supports this idea in similar language: "[I]f the answer gives an admissible
fact, it is receivable, whether the question covered it or not. No party is owner of facts
in his private right. No party can impose silence on the witness called .by Justice." 3 J.
WIGmORE, EVIDENCE S 785 (3d ed. 1940).
,5 See, e.g., State v. Reed, 174 Conn. 287, 300, 386 A.2d 243, 250-51 (1978).
'6 See Adams v. State, 156 Tex. Crim. 63, 67, 225 S.W.2d 568, 570 (1949), modified, 229
S.W.2d 64 (1950) (calls explanation "[an unresponsive answer which is competent").
" See infra text accompanying note 26.
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from the trial record. 8 This right has primarily been a tool of the cross-
examiner, since the party calling the witness often coaches his witness
regarding what to say and not to say. 9 However, by extending the
meaning of the word "explanation" to include unresponsive answers which
contain relevant facts, courts are able to use the rule allowing explana-
tions to limit the number of objections to unresponsive answers." There
are suggestions in some cases that this practice grew out of judicial
intolerance of the unresponsive answer objection." Were the rule
prohibiting unresponsive answers applied strictly, there might be a great
increase in objections and requests to strike by cross-examiners, despite
the fact that any relevant matter contained in the answer might eventually
be allowed into evidence anyway. By use of the rule allowing explana-
tions, the unresponsive portion of the answer is labelled a relevant
explanation beyond the scope of the question and is not objectionable.'
By the interaction of the rule allowing explanation and the expanded mean-
ing of explanation, unresponsive answer objections need only be sustained
to answers which are both unresponsive and irrelevant to any matter
at trial.' The importance of this application of the rule allowing explana-
tions is that, given a judicial intolerance of the unresponsive answer
objection, courts are likely to continue giving witnesses free reign to
explain cross-examination answers. The current rule, by allowing witnesses
to make unresponsive answers during cross-examination, is inconsistent
with the goals of the adversary system. Therefore, a change in the current
rule allowing explanations is needed to force trial judges to sustain more
unresponsive answer objections.
State v. Baker,24 a typical case utilizing the current rule, illustrates how
allowing a witness to explain answers during cross-examination can
interfere with the adversary system. At the trial, a friend who accom-
panied the murder victim on the night of the shooting was cross-examined
by defense counsel.25 The following dialogue ensued:
18 See, e.g., McCord v. Stratten, 227 Ind. 389, 86 N.E.2d 441 (1949).
'9 T. MAUET, supra note 2, at 11-14.
" See, e.g., Adams v. State, 156 Tex. Grim. 63, 66-67, 225 S.W.2d 568, 570 (1949), modified,
229 S.W.2d 64 (1950).
" This intolerance is illustrated by State v. Ferguson, 280 N.C. 95, 185 S.E.2d 119 (1971):
The solicitor's first question was intended to place the defendant on the scene.
Obviously, the next question would involve the sharpening of the knife and
the statement that it would do the work. [The witness], not being familiar
with court techniques and niceties, did not wait for the second question. Should
the court have stricken the answer and waited for the next question which
would produce the answer?
Id. at 98, 185 S.E.2d at 122.
" See State v. Rouse, 256 La. 275, 279, 236 So. 2d 211, 212 (1970).
= See, e.g., Brown v. Wong Gow Sue, 354 Mass. 646, 241 N.E.2d 919 (1968); State v.
Ferguson, 280 N.C. 95, 185 S.E.2d 119 (1971).
24 288 So. 2d 52 (La. 1973).
Id. at 57.
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Q. And is it not a fact that out of ten people that were in the two
line-ups, only one man was asked to step forward?
A. That's correct.
Q. And repeat the words: Give me that purse?
A. That's correct. And the man that was asked to step forward is that
man right there, Mr. Doane, the man in the red shirt, and that's the
same man that killed Harry Bell; he shot him in the side of the head.26
The Louisiana Supreme Court, applying the current rule, found no error
in refusing to strike the witness' answer, saying that a witness "is entitled
to explain his answer .... Moreover, the witness' answer was relevant
and material. He testified to the same effect more than once during the
trial."
Although case law provides more extreme examples of the conflict
between the current rule and the goals of the adversary system," State
v. Baker illustrates the problem best because it contains the kind of
explanation that occurs frequently at trial. More importantly, it shows
how explanations interfere with the ascertainment of truth in the not
uncommon situation in which the witness is closely aligned with the party
who called him. The current rule can keep the full truth from being heard
by the jury, because it allows a reluctant witness to insert emotion-charged
explanations whenever the cross-examiner forces him to admit a helpful
fact. For example, in State v. Baker, the witness, by repeating details
of the killing, may have steered the jury away from the facts the cross-
examiner was trying to present: that the police line-ups had been
irregularly conducted. 9 By stirring the emotions of the jury, the witness
may keep the jurors from understanding the full import of the facts the
cross-examiner raises.
THE ADVERSARY SYSTEM AND THE PROPOSED RULE
Unlike the rule utilized in State v. Baker, the rule proposed by this
note is based on a rational consideration of the adversary system. The
proposed rule is that a witness cannot explain answers to leading questions
during cross-examination except in specified situations," but may give
his explanation on redirect examination. The proposed rule recognizes
that, although natural justice and common sense may indicate that a
witness should be able to interject any relevant fact into his testimony,3'
natural justice is an unattainable ideal. To fashion a rule of trial testimony
Id. at 57-58 (emphasis in original).
Id. at 58.
= See State v. Cook, 280 N.C. 642, 187 S.E.2d 104 (1972). In response to the cross-examiner's
specific question, witness was allowed to respond, "Let's back up just a little," and narrate
facts of his choice. Id. at 650, 187 S.E.2d at 110.
See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
See supra note 4.
3, See supra text accompanying notes 13-15.
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based on that ideal is irrational. Instead, the proposed rule is an orderly
component of the adversary system as it operates in reality. It helps
achieve the goals of the adversary trial system better than the current
rule because it permits the system's own tools for achieving those goals
to operate most efficiently.
The adversary system has two primary goals in deciding what evidence
to allow at trial and when to allow it. These are the goals of ascertainment
of the truth and avoidance of needless consumption of time.2 While
ascertaining the truth is the single most important goal, avoiding needless
consumption of time is a goal of increasing importance in today's highly
litigious society. To achieve these goals, the adversary system has
developed several tools over the years. These tools include cross-
examination, the leading question, redirect examination, and question and
answer interrogation. As with all tools, they can accomplish the task for
which they were designed only if they are allowed to operate as designed.
Thus, supplementary rules of evidence, such as the rule regarding
explanation of answers, should function without interfering with the
operation of these primary tools of the system. The proposed rule does
so better than the current rule. To illustrate this contention, the following
discussion outlines the way in which the individual tools of the adversary
system accomplish the goals of the system, and then illustrates that the
proposed rule helps accomplish these goals better than the current rule.
Cross-Examination, the Leading Question, and Redirect Examination
The Tools for the Ascertainment of the Truth
As a tool of the adversary system, cross-examination aims chiefly at
the ascertainment of truth, and its value in doing so has been recognized
for at least 175 years.' The theory of cross-examination as a device for
eliciting the full truth from a witness is that:
a witness, on his direct examination, discloses but a part of the
necessary facts. That which remains suppressed or undeveloped may
be of two sorts, (a) the remaining and qualifying circumstances of the
subject of testimony, as known to the witness, and (b) the facts which
diminish the personal trustworthiness of the witness.'
The "remaining and qualifying circumstances" remain undisclosed on direct
examination for two possible reasons. First, the witness may be biased
in favor of the party calling him and therefore reluctant to disclose facts
unfavorable to that party. 5 More commonly, these facts are not drawn
3" See State v. Reed, 174 Conn. 287, 300, 386 A.2d 243, 250 (1978); FED. R. EVID. 611(a).
See, e.g., Jackson v. Kniffen, 2 Johns. 31, 35 (N.Y. Sup..Ct. 1806).
5 J. WIGMORE, supra note 14, S 1368. "[Cross-examination] is beyond any doubt the
greatest legal engine ever invented for the discovery of the truth." Id. S 1367.
Id. S 1368.
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from the witness because the counsel who called him elicited mostly facts
favorable to his client.2 6 On the other hand, the facts which impeach the
witness' trustworthiness remain undisclosed because no witness wants
to be the instrument of his own impeachment. 7
If nothing more were done to uncover these undisclosed facts, the full
truth required to provide justice between the litigants would not be
known. Therefore, the adversary system developed cross-examination to
enable counsel for the opposing litigant to develop those hidden facts which
presumably favor his client. By allowing the opponent to sift through the
direct testimony, uncovering lies, bias, exaggerations, and any other
divergencies from the truth, the adversary system uncovers as much of
the truth as is relevant to effectuating justice between the litigants.
Recognition of the power of cross-examination to uncover truth lies behind
the long-established doctrine that due process makes cross-examination
imperative in civil cases," as does the confrontation clause in criminal
cases.
3 9
No matter how effective cross-examination is at uncovering truth, it
has limitations. Therefore, the adversary system allows the cross-examiner
privileges unavailable to the direct examiner in order to bolster his truth-
seeking ability. The most effective privilege is the permission to ask
leading questions." By definition, leading questions suggest to the witness
the answers desired by the cross-examiner,' usually by asking the witness
whether certain facts are true and forcing him to answer yes or no.42
Ordinarily, leading questions are not permitted on direct examination"
because of fear that they supply a false memory to the witness by
suggesting "desired answers not in truth based upon a real recollection."44
However, this suggestive power, coupled with the witness' fear of
committing perjury, sometimes proves to be the only possible way to elicit
the undisclosed truth on cross-examination,4" and this is true even if the
witness is not consciously biased in favor of the party producing him.
One trial judge has written that the very nature of cross-examination
u Id.
3, 3 J. WIGMORE, sup'ra note 14, S 773.
" See, e.g., Armes v. Pierce Governor Co., 121 Ind. App. 566, 101 N.E.2d 199 (1951);
Glassman v. Chicago, R.I., & P. Ry., 166 Iowa 254, 147 N.W. 757 (1914).
+ Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965); Alford v. United States, 282 U.S. 687 (1931).
'0 3 J. WIGMORE, supra note 14, § 773. As a tool of the adversary system, the leading ques-
tion is generally used only on cross-examination. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 611(c).
' C. MCCORMICK, sup-ra note 1, at 9.
42 For example, recall the question asked by the cross-examiner in State v. Baker, 288
So. 2d 52 (La. 1973): "And is it not a fact that out of the ten people that were in the two
line-ups, only one man was asked to step forward?" Id at 57. See also supra notes 24-29
and accompanying text. This question, asking whether certain facts are true and answerable
with yes or no, is a classic example of the leading question.
:3 See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 611(c).
1 3 J. WIcMORE, supra note 14, S 769.
45 Id. § 773.
1982]
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
as a search for untruths in the direct examination creates a feeling of
"contrary flexure" in most witnesses:4"
[W]itnesses under cross-examination seem to labor under the notion
that the cross-examiner is an opponent to them, that he wants to make
them say something they ought not to say, that he is laying traps
for them. They forget most commonly, or act as if they forget, that
they are to tell not only the truth but the whole truth, and think if
they don't tell a lie affirmatively they may negatively suppress the
truth.47
In other words, witnesses are often uncooperative out of a mere un-
willingness to be the instrument of their own discrediting.48 Nonetheless,
the privilege of asking leading questions enables the cross-examiner to
elicit the full truth by asking the witness whether the undisclosed facts
are not in fact true and forcing a yes or no answer.49 Thus, the ability
to ask leading questions is essential for cross-examination to achieve the
adversarial goal of ascertainment of the truth, and as such the leading
question is a necessary tool of the adversary system.
Following cross-examination, the adversary system provides for redirect
examination by the attorney who produced the witness.0 Redirect also
aims to uncover the truth since its purpose is to uncover the remaining
and qualifying circumstances of any new facts elicited on
cross-examination. 1 It also allows counsel to rehabilitate any witness
whose personal trustworthiness was impeached on cross-examination. 2
Although cross-examination, the leading question, and redirect examina-
tion are separate tools of the adversary system, in practice they work
together as a coordinated whole to ensure that every relevant fact a
witness knows can be presented to the jury. Because these three elements
are so precisely developed, any rule regarding witness explanations must
work so that it does not interfere with the effective operation of any of
these elements and should take advantage of the truth-seeking powers
inherent in this interrogational system. In other words, since the objec-
tive of the rule allowing explanations is to present the full truth to the
jury,1 it must work in coordination with the interrogational system design-
ed to do just that. However, the current rule, which seems on its face
to allow the complete truth to come forth,' actually works at cross-
" Shientag, supra note 10, at 14.
" Id. (citation omitted).
48 3 J. WIGMORE, supra note 14, S 773.
49 Id.
See, e.g., C. MCMORMICK, supra note 1, at 6-7.
51 See Dean v. State, 211 Iowa 143, 233 N.W. 36 (1930). "On redirect examination, then,
appellees could clear up any discrepancies brought out on cross-examination." Id. at 151,
233 N.W. at 40.
' C. MCCORMICK, supra note 1, at 105.
'ee supra text accompanying notes 13-15.
5' Id.
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purposes with cross-examination and the leading question, while the pro-
posed rule works within the system and ultimately ensures the more com-
plete ascertainment of truth.
The Effect of Explanation on the Ascertainment of Truth
Under the current rule, the ability to use a leading question can be
rendered completely ineffective. An uncooperative witness can successfully
circumvent attempts to elicit undisclosed facts with a leading question.
Instead of having the right to force the witness to admit or deny the
facts, the cross-examiner is left with the mere right to ask the leading
question. The witness can then avoid answering the leading question by
giving a relevant but unresponsive answer which most courts currently
sustain as a valid explanation.55 In effect, explanations allow a witness
to avoid the threat of perjury presented by answering the yes or no
question. Thus, the current rule limits the ability of the cross-examiner
to elicit the truth from a witness because it limits his ability to place
the witness in the position where he must admit the fact or commit
perjury.
An example of a witness' ability to avoid answering a leading question
under the current rule is provided by Brown v. Wong Gow Sue." The
plaintiff had brought the action to recover for injuries sustained when
his foot was trapped between the floor of the defendant's open-walled
elevator and a ledge on the hoistway wall.' On cross-examination the
plaintiff was asked whether he knew "that you had to keep every part
of your body so that it didn't protrude or go over the edge of the elevator
floor." The following answer was sustained as a relevant but unresponsive
explanation:
When you're standing against the wall and if part of my feet touched
the base of the wall at the bottom of the elevator, I would have known
maybe... I would have known maybe I was leaning one way or the
other. At the time it happened I was away from the wall, my body
was away from the wall safe, and unconsciously, my feet overlapped. 9
The plaintiff's answer in Brown was no answer at all. The cross-
examiner was not able to develop an admission of contributory negligence
as he had planned. The witness' ability to substitute a relevant but
unresponsive answer allowed him to completely evade the leading ques-
tion and thereby avoid a powerful admission against interest.
The proposed rule eliminates this problem by denying the witness the
See cases cited supra note 8.
" 354 Mass. 646, 241 N.E.2d 919 (1968).
Id. at 647, 241 N.E.2d at 920.
Id. at 649, 241 N.E.2d at 921.
' Id.
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right to explain answers during cross-examination in most situations.'
If the cross-examiner chooses to ask a leading question, the witness must
answer either yes or no and cannot evade the question with a relevant
but unresponsive answer. In this way, the proposed rule ensures that
the leading question on cross-examination can develop the full truth.'
Of course, under the current rule the cross-examiner in Brown, had
he been persistent, could have eventually elicited the admission by
repeating his leading question until the witness admitted that, despite
his explanations, the facts asserted were true. This is common practice,62
and the result of the repeated evasive explanations has traditionally been
that the jury may disbelieve a witness' direct testimony based upon his
demeanor on cross-examination."3
This traditional penalty, however, does not sufficiently counterbalance
the harm accomplished by the current rule. For cross-examination to
uncover the truth as it was intended to do, the opportunity afforded must
be one of effective cross-examination." The current rule enables a witness
to render cross-examination virtually ineffective. Not only can he avoid
answering counsel's leading questions with his relevant but unresponsive
explanations, he may also render the interrogation unintelligible by disrup-
ting an orderly presentation of the remaining and qualifying facts which
the cross-examiner desires to prove. As Professor Jones warned, "If non-
responsive answers were permitted to stand, there would be no order
which examining counsel could dependably rely upon" 5 because the cur-
rent rule gives a witness substantial power to determine when certain
facts are elicited, and use of this power can disrupt the planned order
of the cross-examiner.66 Thus, under the current rule, witness explana-
tions may lessen the power of cross-examination to achieve its main goal,
o See supra note 4.
61 Although the occasion is less frequent, the proposed rule should also apply when a
direct examiner receives permission to ask leading questions because he has called an adverse
witness. See generally 3 J. WIGMORE, supra note 14, § 774.
62 See, e.g., Lowman v. Lowman, 109 Ind. App. 163, 33 N.E.2d 780 (1941):
Only the trial court sees the witnesses on the stand, their demeanor in
testifying, their candor, or lack of candor, in disclosing facts about which they
have knowledge. Juries and trial courts, quite often, properly, give more weight
to the demeanor of witnesses than to the substance of their statements in
the determination of truth.
Id. at 174, 33 N.E.2d at 785.
' See Shientag, supra note 10, at 18.
6 Cf Warren v. State, 292 Ala. 71, 288 So. 2d 826 (1973) (court held defendant must
be given sample of alleged marijuana confiscated at his arrest so that he will have analysis
results with which to cross-examine state's expert witness effectively). Wigmore also indicates
that cross-examination can fail for lack of effectiveness in some circumstances because of
defects "connected with the conduct of the examination." 5 J. WIGMORE, supra note 14, S
1390.
65 5 B. JONES, COMMENTARIES ON EVIDENCE § 2313 (2d ed. 1926).
' An excellent example of the complete disruption of a cross-examiner's efforts to present
facts in an orderly manner is State v. Cook, 280 N.C. 642, 187 S.E.2d 104 (1972), discussed
supra note 28.
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and to balance this loss there is only the possibility that the jury will
discount the value of the direct testimony because of the evasive explana-
tions. The jury's response is too uncontrollable to counterbalance the loss
to the search for truth. As often as not, the jury may conclude that the
cross-examiner was trying to "bottle up" the witness and thereby hide
the real truth. The proposed rule makes the truth easier to elicit and
avoids the necessity of depending upon the jury's impressions. In doing
so, it makes cross-examination a more effective tool of the adversary
system.
The proposed rule also ensures a more complete disclosure of truth
at trial because it takes advantage of the truth-seeking mechanisms
already developed by the adversary system. The proposed rule does not
keep the witness' explanations out of trial; it does not mean a witness
can never explain answers that are given on cross-examination. Instead,
it provides only that during cross-examination a witness cannot explain
answers. The proper time for the explanation is on redirect. 7 The theory
of redirect examination has always intended this, because an explanation,
if it is genuine and not merely an evasionary tactic, is a remaining and
qualifying fact not raised by cross-examination.68
This is the key to the proposed rule. The current rule seems to view
cross-examination as an isolated event, suggesting that unless the witness
explains his answer during cross-examination his chance will be lost and
some element of the truth will never be heard. The proposed rule properly
views cross-examination as a part of the whole adversary system of
interrogation. Thus, the proposed rule does not succumb to the argument
that denying a witness the right to explain during cross-examination keeps
some element of the truth from the jury.' The proposed rule does not
impose silence on the witness; it merely delays his explanations until
redirect. In doing so, the proposed rule distinguishes between the two
kinds of explanation70 and deals with-them in a way the current rule is
incapable of doing. First, those explanations which are truly explanations,
that is, explanations of remaining and qualifying circumstances of the
cross-examination testimony, will be raised on redirect. These must be
uncovered if the full truth is to be known. On the other hand, those
8, Rehabilitation of an impeached witness provides a useful parallel, since impeachment
of witnesses is as much a purpose of cross-examination as is eliciting remaining and qualifying
facts. Courts and commentators have always assumed that if a witness is to be rehabilitated
by his own testimony, that rehabilitation occurs on redirect. See Oppenshaw v. Adams,
92 Idaho 488, 445 P.2d 663 (1968); Aboussie v. McBroom, 421 S.W.2d 805 (Mo. App. 1967);
C. MCCORMICK, supra note 1, at 105. Since an explanation of cross-examination testimony
shares the same purpose of undoing what the cross-examination has done, it follows that
the explanation also should occur on redirect.
" See Smith v. Pacific Truck Express, 164 Ore. 318, 333-34, 100 P.2d 474, 480 (1940);
cf. 5 J. WIGMORE, supra note 14, S 1368.
" See supra text accompanying notes 13-15.
78 See supra text accompanying note 16.
19821
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
explanations which are really just unresponsive answers, and which in
the context of cross-examination are evasive and undesirable, will no
longer be given because on redirect examination the witness has no more
occasion to be evasive.71
In the latter category is the explanation in State v. Baker.2 Although
the facts contained in the explanation were relevant, they did not in any
way qualify the facts elicited by counsel and would not have been raised
on redirect. In fact, the court noted that the witness had "testified to
the same effect more than once during the trial,"7 showing that the
witness' real interest was evasion of the leading question, not full
disclosure of the truth. The current rule cannot distinguish these two
types of explanations because the witness gives the explanation before
it is determined to be of the desirable or the undesirable type.74 Under
the proposed rule, only the desirable type of explanation is given, because
on redirect the occasion for evasiveness has disappeared. Thus, the
proposed rule makes the whole adversary system of interrogation more
effective by bolstering its mechanics.
Question and Answer Interrogation
Question and answer interrogation has two functions as a tool of the
adversary system and this explains its preferred position today over free
narration by the witness. 5 First, it helps avoid the needless consumption
of time at trial because it elicits the witness' testimony in an orderly
manner without repetition or omission.78 Second, the question and answer
format aids the search for truth by affording opposing counsel opportunity
to object to inadmissible answers before they are given, rather than having
to resort to the more ineffective motion to strike.7
Even casual observation of the current rule indicates that it works at
cross-purposes with question and answer interrogation. The explanation
allowed in State v. Stillman" provides an excellent illustration. After the
prosecution's witness had testified on direct examination, defense counsel
tried to impeach her by showing that she had asked for five hundred
dollars from the defendant so she could leave town. 9 Before she answered,
the witness asked, "Your Honor, may I make a statement, please?""
Defense counsel insisted on a yes or no answer and the witness responded,
' See supra text accompanying notes 50-52.
288 So. 2d 52, 57 (La. 1973). See supra text accompanying note 26.
7 Baker, 288 So. 2d at 58.
7' See Eiland v. State, 246 Ga. 112, 116-17, 268 S.E.2d 922, 926 (1980).
5 3 J. WIGMORE, supra note 14, S 767.
7' See C. MCCORMICK, supra note 1, at 8.
3 J. WIGMORE, supra note 14, S 767.
301 S.W.2d 830 (Mo. 1957).
Id. at 833.
80 Id.
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"Yes, I did."8 When the court then told her she could make her
explanation, the witness launched into this tale:
Your Honor, when I came out of the hospital, my brother-in-law David
Mitchell came to my house, saw me himself, and he said there was
a man wanted to talk to me and the man wanted to know-.... He
said he had somebody who had wanted to talk to me, and he took
me over to this man's house and the man-.... He asked me, hadn't
I got myself into a mess, and I asked him what he meant, so he
proceeded to tell me. [The court then asked if she was finished.] No,
I haven't finished. He took me over to Flora Avenue, Mr. Beelik, and
I told him I didn't want to talk to him and he said he had promised
he would bring me by .... He said he had heard about the trouble
that I had gotten into, and he (Mr. Beelik) wanted to know-....
My brother-in-law got out of the car and walked around to the front
and he said he would stand there and see that nothing happened, that
the man only wanted to talk to me. And as I stated before, I did not
want to testify here, and so I told him. I did not want to testify, it
was my fault for going to him as much as it was his fault for doing
it .... 8 2
Stillman illustrates how the current rule potentially wastes time at
trial. When a witness is allowed to make a lengthy explanation during
cross-examination there is a possibility that entire portions of the narrative
will later have to be stricken, as were the hearsay portions of the
testimony in Stillman.' The answer may also be incomprehensible, as
in Stillman, and therefore a waste of time. A similar problem is that often
a persistent cross-examiner must ask his witness the same question several
times before the witness stops making unresponsive answers and properly
answers the question. The proposed rule eliminates all these problems.
It forces the witness to answer only the question asked and refrain from
explanation. By doing so, it eliminates the unresponsive answer which
courts have improperly called explanations,' thereby avoiding loss of the
time these explanations require. It also forces the kind of explanation
in Stillman to be brought out on redirect, thereby allowing opposing
counsel a chance to catch inadmissible matter before the long explana-
tion is given and thus saving time.
Stillman also illustrates how the current rule impairs the search for
truth by disregarding the screening mechanism built into the question
and answer format. Under the current rule, the cross-examiner has no
way of combating an explanation until after the jury has heard it. If the
explanation contained inadmissible matter, he must move to strike the
answer. However, the ability of the jury to disregard the inadmissible
evidence is questionable. 5 Because the jury often cannot disregard the
81 Id.
82 Id.
' Id. at 834.
See sura text accompanying note 16.
' Shientag, supra note 10, at 18.
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evidence, the search for truth is impaired by the jury's subsequent
inability to consider the evidence clearly and objectively. The proposed
rule, on the other hand, offers the cross-examiner a better chance to keep
the testimony from the jury's ears. Since the proposed rule allows no
explanations during cross-examination, any explanations containing
inadmissible matter must be raised on redirect in response to a specific
question where the natural screening mechanism of the question and
answer format again operates. If the question calls for inadmissible matter
the cross-examiner has a chance to object before the answer is given;
the current rule does not offer this chance.
CONCLUSION
The current rule, which allows explanations during cross-examination,
does more to impair the goals of the adversary system than it does to
support them. If the adversary system hopes to uncover the full truth
behind a controversy without a waste of time, the cross-examiner must
be free to sift through the direct testimony and to elicit all the undisclosed
facts. To do this, the cross-examiner must be able to lead an uncooperative
witness to the point where he must admit the truth or be threatened
with perjury. This is possible only where the cross-examiner has the power
to hold the witness to a direct answer without explanation. The proposed
rule gives the cross-examiner this power without denying the witness
his opportunity to tell everything he knows. The proper place for witness
explanation is on redirect examination. When explanations are elicited
on redirect the goals of the adversary system will be met.
JEFFREY A. BOYLL
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